Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter
  • David Bounie
  • , Antoine Dubus
  • and Patrick Waelbroeck
02/06/25
- Journals
We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.
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Institut Louis Bachelier - Fondation du risque
Cartes Bancaires CB
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Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
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Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution